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TIME, DUE PROCESS, AND REPRESENTATION:  
AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONTINUANCES IN IMMIGRATION COURT 
David Hausman* & Jayashri Srikantiah** 
 
Since 2014, U.S. immigration courts have expedited the cases of many 
children and families fleeing persecution in Mexico and Central America.  
This Article conducts an empirical and legal analysis of this policy, 
revealing that reasonable time between immigration court hearings is 
necessary to protect the statutory and constitutional rights to legal 
representation.  A large majority of immigrants facing deportation—
including those part of the recent surge of children and families from 
Central America and Mexico—appear at their first deportation hearing 
without a lawyer, often because they cannot afford one. 
When an immigrant appears without a lawyer and does not expressly 
waive his or her right to counsel, the immigration judge (IJ) must grant a 
continuance that allows a reasonable period of time for an immigrant to 
search for and retain counsel.  Yet existing law does not specify what 
period of time is reasonable, and the courts of appeals disagree over how 
closely to scrutinize an IJ’s decision to deny a continuance. 
In this Article, we use schedule data from the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review to show that the length of a continuance has a large 
effect on immigrants’ likelihood of finding counsel, of appearing at 
subsequent hearings, and of eventually avoiding removal.  Our analysis 
demonstrates that shorter continuances for unrepresented children and 
families prevented many from finding counsel and avoiding deportation.  In 
light of these findings, we examine the due process and statutory 
consequences of an IJ’s decision to deny a continuance or to grant an 
overly short continuance.  We conclude by recommending that initial 
continuances of fewer than ninety days should be presumptively invalid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On July 9, 2014, at the height of the recent surge of Central American 
children’s border crossings, Juan P. Osuna, the director of the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), announced new policies for children 
and families in deportation proceedings:  the immigration courts would 
prioritize the cases of both unaccompanied children and families with 
children.1  In the announcement, Osuna stated that EOIR had added a newly 
prioritized docket in immigration courts across the country.2  Under the 
directive, immigration judges (IJ) were instructed to give expedited 
consideration to priority docket cases.3  Osuna’s announcement meant that the 
over 57,000 cases4 involving unaccompanied children and families with 
children5 would be placed at the head of the line in immigration court. 
Under this directive, priority cases were to be heard even more quickly 
than those of immigrants detained during the pendency of removal 
proceedings.  Usually, immigration courts prioritize detained cases to 
prevent unnecessary time spent in detention.  Before the new priority 
dockets, detained cases were the ones with the highest priority and were 
resolved quickly—typically in well under a year.6  The slowest-moving 
 
 1. See Challenges at the Border:  Examining the Causes, Consequences, and 
Responses to the Rise in Apprehensions at the Southern Border:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 3 (July 9, 2014) (statement 
of Juan P. Osuna, Dir. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec. Office for Immigration Review) 
[hereinafter Osuna Directive], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/ 
witnesses/attachments/2015/02/05/07-09-14-eoir-osuna-testimony-re-challenges-at-the-
border-examining-the-.pdf [perma.cc/QQA8-ZF4Y].  For more information on the Central 
American refugee crisis, see Children on the Run:  Unaccompanied Children Leaving 
Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection, U.N. HIGH COMM. 
FOR REFUGEES, http://unhcrwashington.org/children (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) 
[perma.cc/SNP8-VEJ7]. 
 2. See Osuna Directive, supra note 1. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See infra Table 1. 
 5. In the immigration context, these include all respondents up to the age of twenty-
one.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) defines a child as an unmarried 
person under twenty-one. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2012). 
 6. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in 
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2015) (noting mean case durations of 146 
and twenty-three days for represented and unrepresented detained cases, respectively). 
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cases in immigration courts, by contrast, are those of individuals who are 
not detained and not on a priority docket.  Those cases regularly last several 
years—years longer than newly prioritized but otherwise similar children’s 
and families’ cases.7 
In this Article, we show that the priority dockets announced by Osuna 
had an important side effect:  they prevented many immigrants from finding 
lawyers.  Because immigration proceedings are classified as civil, rather 
than criminal, the federal government has long insisted that immigrants 
have no right to a government-provided lawyer, regardless of whether they 
are adults or children.8  Many immigrants facing deportation lack the 
savings to hire a private lawyer immediately after proceedings begin.  
Instead, they are only able to save for and engage a lawyer (or find someone 
to represent them for free) if they have months before a final hearing in 
court.  Osuna’s directive, expediting Central American migrants’ cases, 
forced thousands of immigrants to move forward with their proceedings 
before they were able to retain a lawyer.9 
Part I shows that different immigration courts and judges within each 
court varied in how strictly they implemented Osuna’s directive.  We take 
advantage of that variation to estimate just how much difference a longer 
continuance makes to an immigrant’s ability to retain an attorney.  Using 
data obtained by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from EOIR, 
we find that increasing the time between the first and second hearing from 
one to two months doubled children’s and families’ chances of finding a 
lawyer. 
This empirical finding suggests that the current doctrine is inadequate 
and leads directly to doctrinal recommendations.  Part II summarizes the 
state of the law:  because immigrants who lack lawyers and are swiftly 
deported rarely appeal, the case law on continuance length is not well 
developed.  In Part III, reasoning from our findings and from the statutory 
and constitutional rights to counsel, we propose that, for immigrants 
without lawyers, an initial continuance of at least ninety days should be 
presumptively required.  This recommendation reflects our result that the 
chance of finding a lawyer increases most steeply during this first ninety-
day period.  Finally, we also suggest that EOIR, which provided the 
database that we analyze, could perform this analysis for each immigration 
court annually, providing a more narrowly tailored presumption that reflects 
 
 7. See id. (noting a mean case duration of over 600 days for represented nondetained 
respondents). 
 8. See, e.g., Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 5–8, 
J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (No. 2:14-cv-01026). 
 9. At the same time that Osuna announced the expedited docket, he also announced 
funding for lawyers to represent unaccompanied children. See Osuna Directive, supra note 
1, at 3.  These approximately 100 attorneys have played an important role, but they have 
been limited to the representation of unaccompanied children under sixteen, leaving families 
and older children with the need to seek representation. See Justice AmeriCorps Legal 
Services for Unaccompanied Children, CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., 
http://www.nationalservice.gov/build-your-capacity/grants/funding-opportunities/2014/ 
justice-americorps-legal-services#FAQs (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/75LD-
YA2H]. 
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local conditions (and that might result in longer continuances in certain 
immigration courts). 
These findings and recommendations fit within a growing literature and 
advocacy on immigrants’ access to counsel.  For example, a pathbreaking 
program in New York City recently secured funding for publicly funded 
representation for all detained immigrants facing deportation in New York 
City’s immigration court,10 and other states and cities have considered 
providing similar funding.11  Further, a recent class action lawsuit secured 
access to representation for some mentally disabled immigrants in 
detention,12 and a currently pending suit seeks government-provided 
representation for children facing deportation.13  We call attention to an 
understudied piece of this puzzle:  the time needed to secure representation. 
I.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS:  
HOW CONTINUANCES MATTER IN PRACTICE 
For children and families who are not detained during their removal 
proceedings, more time before a final hearing means more time in the 
country, more time to find a lawyer, and a better chance of winning the 
right to stay in the United States.  Of the over 57,000 children and their 
family members whose cases the Obama Administration prioritized, 14 
percent began their immigration proceedings with a lawyer and 44 percent 
found a lawyer by the time of their second hearing.14  Most families and 
children who found lawyers found them after their first court appearance.15  
 
 10. See New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, VERA INST. JUST., 
http://www.vera.org/project/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project (last visited Mar. 27, 
2016) (describing the project, a public defender program for detained immigrants facing 
deportation in New York City’s immigration court) [perma.cc/XLT6-V2R3]; see also 
STEERING COMM. OF THE N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY REPORT, ACCESSING 
JUSTICE:  THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 
(2011), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Accessing%20Justice.pdf (report providing basis for 
funding for representation in New York) [perma.cc/7LSR-E8EP]. 
 11. See, e.g., San Francisco Allocates $2.1M to Legal Aid for Unaccompanied Minors, 
Families Facing Deportation, CBS SF BAY AREA (Sept. 16, 2014), http:// 
sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/09/16/san-francisco-allocates-2-1m-to-legal-aid-for-
unaccompanied-minors-families-facing-deportation-david-campos-central-america-el-
salvador-guatemala-honduras-mexico-undocumented [perma.cc/MH4Q-ALQ2]. 
 12. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10–02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 
3674492, at *16, *20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (entering permanent injunction). 
 13. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction, J.E.F.M., 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (No. 2:14-
cv-01026-TSZ) [hereinafter J.E.F.M. Motion for Preliminary Injunction]. 
 14. See infra Table 1.  All data reflect the state of the immigration courts’ database on 
April 30, 2015, when the data for our most recent FOIA request was extracted.  For these 
summary statistics, we consider all children and families whose cases were expedited but 
who were not detained—those marked “UC” (unaccompanied child) or “AWC/ATD” (adults 
with children/alternatives to detention) in the immigration court’s database.  A small number 
of these cases—under 10 percent—are marked as initially detained, so the vast majority are 
never detained.  For the analysis below, which considers the effect of time before the group 
of 100 Justice America lawyers began its work, see supra note 9, we consider only cases that 
had their first hearing between August 1, 2014, and January 1, 2015. 
 15. See infra Table 1. 
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The more time they had between hearings, the more likely they were to find 
a lawyer.16 
Immigration proceedings start with a scheduling hearing called a master 
calendar hearing.  Immigrants sit on benches in the back of the courtroom, 
and the judge calls them one by one for a short colloquy.  When immigrants 
come to their first hearing without a lawyer (as most do), the IJ tells them 
that they have a right to lawyer at their own expense.17  Then the IJ offers a 
continuance to give each immigrant time to look for a lawyer.18  A long 
wait means more time in the country and, therefore, more time to save up 
for a paid lawyer or to find a nonprofit or pro bono attorney. 
Why does more time make a difference?  First, immigrants often do not 
have enough money saved to pay an attorney immediately.  Full 
representation in immigration court can cost several thousand dollars.  
Gathering the money may require saving over months, together with 
support from friends and family and other forms of loans.19  Second, 
finding a lawyer may not be easy even with some money saved up.  For 
example, an attorney who frequently volunteers on the priority docket in 
San Francisco’s immigration court points out that even reaching 
immigration attorneys may be difficult, simply because many lawyers are 
busy:  “I explain that you should space out the calls and always leave a 
message, including your phone number.  I explain that lawyers often don’t 
call back, but you need to fight for yourself and you need to do these 
things.”20  These combined obstacles—lack of resources and lack of 
information about removal proceedings—make time important for finding 
counsel. 
IJs give some immigrants more time than they give others.  Some of 
these differences in wait times reflect random scheduling decisions—an IJ 
often assigns immigrants in first master calendar hearings to one of several 
dates, some of which are later than others and some of which may be more 
convenient for assuring the presence of an interpreter.  But the court 
database also shows that immigration courts vary in how strict they are with 
extensions.  Some IJs, and some courts, tend to give several continuances 
with six months or more between hearings; others give only one or two 
continuances with only a month or two between hearings.21 
 
 16. See infra Figure 2. 
 17. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(3) (2015). 
 18. See IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15(g) (2009), http://www.justice. 
gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf [perma.cc/4BJP-
YELA]. 
 19. The literature on how poor households finance large medical expenses documents 
such coping strategies.  When households are able to gather the money to pay for such large 
expenses, they often fall further into poverty. See, e.g., Gabriela Flores et al., Coping with 
Health-Care Costs:  Implications for the Measurement of Catastrophic Expenditures and 
Poverty, 17 HEALTH ECON. 1393, 1393–95 (2008) (summarizing literature on coping with 
health expenses). 
 20. Telephone Interview with Att’y Courtney McDermed (June 15, 2015). 
 21. See infra Figure 1. 
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When Osuna announced the expedited children’s docket in July 2014, IJs 
reacted:  the median first continuance dropped from ninety-four to seventy-
eight days.22  This change mattered.  The policy of expediting hearings 
shortened many continuances enough to prevent children and families from 
finding lawyers. 
Even after the nationwide decision to expedite, the length of 
continuances varied from court to court, from IJ to IJ, and from immigrant 
to immigrant, allowing us to estimate the importance of continuance length.  
Figure 1 shows average continuance lengths for children and families who 
came to their first hearing without lawyers at the immigration courts that 
heard at least 1000 expedited cases between August 1, 2014, and January 1, 
2015.23  Different courts adopted widely different policies:  the average first 
continuance in Chicago (over 150 days) was three times longer than in 
Atlanta (under fifty days).24  In our regression analysis below, we control 
for differences across courts (and IJs) to measure the effect of less time on 
case outcomes, but initially, we present these cross-court differences to 
illustrate the degree of variation in continuance length. 
  
 
 22. More precisely, the median first continuance length for nondetained and released 
juvenile cases with a first hearing in 2013 was ninety-four days; the median first continuance 
for unaccompanied children and families with children between August 1, 2014, and January 
1, 2015, (the period in which cases were most expedited) was seventy-eight days. 
 23. These averages exclude continuances of longer than 200 days, which make up fewer 
than 20 percent of all continuances.  These longer continuances often reflect a different 
dynamic at work; for example, a judge may adjourn a case in order to give a child time to 
file an application for asylum with U.S. Customs and Immigration Services.  Although we 
did not drop them, very short continuances may also occasionally reflect a different 
dynamic; for example, if an immigrant or lawyer is unable to appear on short notice and 
informs the court, sometimes a hearing may be rescheduled quickly. 
 24. See infra Figure 1. 
2016] ANALYZING CONTINUANCES IN IMMIGRATION COURT 1829 
Figure 1:  Average Continuance Length 
by Court for Priority Docket Cases 
  
  
 Table 1 illustrates the time dynamic in priority docket cases; with each 
hearing, more and more immigrants are represented, but there are fewer and 
fewer respondents.  This attrition reflects both the fact that many 
immigrants are ordered deported at their first and second hearings and that 
many immigrants have not yet appeared for their second or third hearing, 
because these cases began recently.25 
  
 
 25. In order to identify when a respondent first had a lawyer, we used the earliest of 
three dates:  (1)  the EOIR-28 date, which is not always recorded when a lawyer is present 
but reflects the date when the lawyer first formally entered an appearance, (2)  the first date 
on which an Alien Attorney Code is recorded in the schedule table, and (3)  the first date on 
which an EOIR Attorney ID is recorded in the EOIR schedule table.  Sometimes the EOIR-
28 date is updated when attorneys enter subsequent appearances; that should not affect our 
results, because we use the first of these three measures. 
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Table 1:  Representation Over Time 
for Children and Families on Priority Dockets 
 
 First 
Hearing 
Second 
Hearing 
Third 
Hearing 
Percentage with 
Lawyer 14% 44% 64% 
Number with 
Lawyer 8,154 14,705 10,132 
Total 57,410 33,420 15,948 
Source:  EOIR CASE Database, Never Detained Priority Children’s and Family Cases. 
 
These differences do not just speed cases up or slow them down.  They 
also change IJs’ decisions:  more time means a better chance of finding a 
lawyer.  In order to estimate this effect reliably, we rely on a key fact about 
the first master calendar hearing:  IJs grant a first continuance as a matter of 
course.26  In other words, at the first hearing, children without lawyers are 
always granted a continuance, and judges do not address the merits before 
granting that continuance.  We therefore need not worry that the merits of 
the cases explain the effects that we find. 
Those effects are large.  Figure 2 considers children and families who 
arrived in immigration court without a lawyer and shows that the more days 
that elapse before a second hearing, the more likely that the child or family 
will have a lawyer at that second hearing.27  This figure includes all cases 
marked by EOIR as unaccompanied children or adults with children on 
alternatives to detention; less than 10 percent of these cases began with 
detention.  Moving from a one-month to a two-month continuance nearly 
doubles the chance of finding a lawyer, from just over 20 percent to nearly 
40 percent.28  The effect levels off over time:  after 100 days, longer 
continuances make a smaller difference, though still a significant one.29 
  
 
 26. See infra note 36 (describing regulations and the practice manual governing 
immigration judges’ grants of continuances to seek representation). 
 27. Note that the database marks cases as “adults with children” and does not distinguish 
between the adults and the children in these groups. 
 28. See infra Figure 2. 
 29. See infra Figure 2. 
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Figure 2:  Continuance Length and Representation 
for Priority Docket Cases 
 
 
Given the importance of time for finding a lawyer, it should come as no 
surprise that longer continuances also give children and families a better 
chance of winning the right to remain in the United States.  Figure 3 shows 
the effect of more time on the chance of deportation at the second hearing.30  
These estimates are necessarily incomplete:  most immigration proceedings 
do not end at the second hearing.31  Still, there is a distinct pattern that 
resembles the effect of time on finding a lawyer:  more time helps, 
especially at the beginning.32 
  
 
 30. For simplicity, we count voluntary departure as deportation.  Even though it carries 
different legal consequences, it requires the immigrant to leave the United States. 
 31. A few proceedings also end at the first hearing. 
 32. See infra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  Continuance Length and Deportation 
for Priority Docket Cases 2 
  
 
So far, we have shown that the amount of time that IJs grant between the 
first and second hearings—a routine determination that does not reflect the 
merits of cases, but does vary across judges and courts—is highly 
correlated with legal representation and outcomes at the second hearing.  
One may wonder, however, whether these results simply reflect differing 
caseloads across immigration courts and judges:  perhaps some IJs both 
grant more time and help immigrants find lawyers in other ways.  To 
account for that possibility, we verify the results in Figures 2 and 3 with 
regressions that employ fixed effects at the IJ level.  These fixed effects 
control for variation caused by both IJs and courts; because IJs generally 
work in one court, there is little need for court fixed effects in addition.  The 
results, shown in Tables 2 and 3 below, are very similar to those in the 
figures:  holding caseload and judge constant, more time leads to a better 
chance of finding a lawyer and avoiding deportation.  In other words, even 
looking at one judge at a time, immigrants granted longer continuances are 
significantly more likely to find representation and avoid deportation.  As in 
these figures, the effect of more time is strongest in comparisons between 
relatively short continuances. 
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Table 2:  Effect of Continuance Length 
on Representation at Second Hearing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 200 Days or Fewer 
100 Days or 
Fewer 
50 Days or 
Fewer 
Continuance 
Length 0.00187
*** 0.00282*** 0.00371*** 
 (0.000268) (0.000281) (0.000628) 
    
Central 
American 0.0613 0.0556 0.00963 
 (0.0418) (0.0413) (0.0335) 
    
Intercept 0.145** 0.104* 0.113** 
 (0.0440) (0.0406) (0.0385) 
N 26,772 20,085 9,016 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  All models include IJ fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the 
IJ level.  Note that the sample only includes cases with first hearings between August 1, 2014, and 
January 1, 2015.   
 
* p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 3:  Effect of Continuance Length 
on Deportation Orders at Second Hearing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 200 Days or Fewer
100 Days or 
Fewer
50 Days or 
Fewer 
Continuance 
Length -0.000651
** -0.000554 -0.00120 
 (0.000199) (0.000368) (0.00138) 
  
Central 
American -0.103
* -0.0938 -0.0129 
 (0.0465) (0.0497) (0.0433) 
  
Intercept 1.015*** 1.008*** 0.973*** 
 (0.0466) (0.0510) (0.0609) 
N 4,163 3,145 1,782 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  All models include IJ fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the 
IJ level.  Note that the sample only includes cases with first hearings between August 1, 2014, and 
January 1, 2015. 
 
* p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001. 
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Although the IJ-fixed effects allow us to be confident that time matters 
independent of IJs’ preferences, IJs do also use time to influence outcomes.  
Many IJs understand that longer continuances can help immigrants find a 
lawyer and successfully apply for relief.  The same IJs who are more likely 
to order immigrants deported also grant shorter and fewer continuances.33  
This pattern holds for children and families:  IJs who allow longer 
continuances are less likely to have ordered children and families deported 
at their second hearing.34 
Figure 4, below, shows the results:  the longer the average continuance, 
the lower the chance of deportation.  There are relatively few IJs who have 
heard families’ and children’s cases on the priority docket, and those cases 
may not have been randomly assigned.  Nonetheless, there is good reason to 
believe that this relationship is real:  it matches similar results from the 
adult docket.35 
 
Figure 4:  Judges’ Deportation Rates 
and Continuance Lengths for Priority Docket 
 
 
 33. David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 19–24), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2568960 [https://perma.cc/XVM6-WLPV]. 
 34. To test whether more generous IJs also granted children and families longer 
continuances, we look at cases that had a first hearing between August 1, 2014, and January 
1, 2015, and that received a continuance of fewer than 150 days.  Note that in the previous 
regressions, unlike in the figures, we include continuances of up to 200 days; the shorter 
length for the figures makes these easier to display, but there is little substantive difference.  
We included only IJs who heard at least 200 cases on the priority docket.  Next, we 
demeaned the average first continuance time by court and also demeaned each IJ’s 
deportation rate (at a child or family’s second hearing) by court. 
 35. See id. 
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Finally, the skeptical reader may still wonder whether IJs allow more 
time for cases to which they are more sympathetic; perhaps the results 
reflect this correlation between sympathy and continuances, rather than the 
effect of extra time.  That hypothesis, however, does not fit the nature of the 
initial hearing before an IJ.  When the immigrant appears without a lawyer, 
the IJ grants a continuance as a matter of course and usually without a 
detailed inquiry into the case.36  This short interaction with the IJ does not 
allow time for the IJ to develop a view about the likely merits of the case 
and to grant a longer continuance to an immigrant with a more meritorious 
case. 
In sum, these data offer convincing evidence that continuance length 
influences both access to counsel and eventual outcomes in immigration 
court.  Longer continuances mean fewer deportations. 
II.  A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO FIND COUNSEL 
The U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
(INA), and immigration regulations all protect the right to counsel, but case 
law has not fully addressed the implications of that right for IJs’ decisions 
about continuances.  In this part, we describe the origins and contours of the 
right to a reasonable time to seek counsel.  First, we describe the growing 
civil Gideon movement and its accompanying scholarly work.  That 
movement has focused on the extension of a right to representation to 
particularly vulnerable populations—in the immigration context, 
unaccompanied children and mentally disabled respondents.  We survey 
this literature in order to situate our contribution.  We describe a 
complementary right that cuts across populations of respondents:  the right 
to a reasonable opportunity, in the form of a reasonable continuance, to 
obtain counsel at no expense to the government.  This right is not a new 
one, but in the absence of data on the effects of longer and shorter 
continuances, courts’ focus has been on the grant or denial of a continuance 
rather than its length.  There is a consensus that the Constitution and INA 
protect the right, at least under some circumstances, to a continuance to 
seek counsel.  The circuits differ, however, on how much deference they 
grant an IJ’s denial of a continuance.  Moreover, the circuits are split on 
whether to require respondents to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by 
the denial of a continuance.  Finally, and most important for the purposes of 
our analysis, neither the courts of appeals nor the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) offer guidance on the length of a reasonable continuance.  
Perhaps this lack of guidance helps explain the dramatic variation across IJs 
and courts in the average length of a continuance. 
Because the courts and the BIA offer little guidance on the scope of the 
due process right to a reasonable continuance, we set out a framework for 
evaluating the reasonableness of a continuance.  That framework explicitly 
 
 36. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1) (2015) (requiring immigration judge to inform 
respondent of right to counsel at no expense to the government); see also IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 18, § 4.15(e). 
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acknowledges the need for empirical evidence, a need that is implicit in the 
current due process doctrine.  The leading doctrinal standards for evaluating 
the necessity of additional procedures under the Constitution—the Mathews 
v. Eldridge37 test and the related fundamental fairness standard in 
immigration law—both require judges (and the Executive) to make 
empirical, predictive judgments.  We take the additional step of urging that 
these decision makers consider systematic empirical evidence when it is 
available. 
A.  Representation for Vulnerable Populations 
As advocates and scholars have argued that immigrants facing 
deportation should have counsel appointed and paid for by the government, 
they have often focused on identifying feasible next steps toward that goal.  
Such steps have typically identified some group of immigrants facing 
deportation as especially vulnerable. 
Perhaps most prominently, two important class actions have sought 
government-provided representation for two particularly vulnerable 
populations of immigrants facing removal:  (1)  mentally ill immigrants 
who are also detained pending their removal, and (2)  children.  In Franco-
Gonzalez v. Holder,38 the plaintiffs secured a permanent injunction 
requiring the provision of representation, at government expense, for 
mentally ill immigration detainees.39  The plaintiffs prevailed partly on 
Rehabilitation Act grounds; the court held that government-provided 
counsel was a reasonable accommodation for their mental disability.40  In 
other words, the rationale was that mentally ill respondents are especially 
unable to represent themselves.  The same concern underlies J.E.F.M. v. 
Holder,41 in which the plaintiffs sought counsel for children facing removal 
proceedings, arguing that children are less able than adults to represent 
themselves competently.  These concerns also motivated San Francisco’s 
funding for representation for unaccompanied children and families facing 
deportation.42  Furthermore, scholars have argued persuasively that children 
facing a complex legal system are particularly entitled to representation.43 
Detention raises similar issues:  without free access to communication 
and legal resources, immigrants in detention are less able to represent 
themselves.44  The New York Family Unity Project recently began 
providing representation to all immigrants in New York City who are 
detained pending their deportation.45  The project uses a public defender 
 
 37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 38. No. CV 10–02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
 39. Id. at *20. 
 40. Id. at *5. 
 41. 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 42. See supra note 11. 
 43. See, e.g., Ashley Ham Pong, Humanitarian Protections and the Need for Appointed 
Counsel for Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Facing Deportation, 21 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 68 (2014). 
 44. Of course, detention without counsel raises liberty concerns as well. 
 45. See New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, supra note 10. 
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model, with some attorneys working directly in criminal public defenders’ 
offices and others based at nonprofits.46 
We contribute to this growing literature and growing movement with a 
complementary approach that stresses access to nonappointed counsel, 
acknowledging that few immigrants currently have access to appointed 
counsel.  Although we concentrate on the immigration courts’ recent 
prioritization of children’s and families’ cases, which reduced access to 
counsel for a particularly vulnerable population, our argument holds equally 
for adult respondents, who may be competent to represent themselves under 
the current doctrine, but nonetheless possess a right to reasonable access to 
counsel—and therefore to a reasonable continuance. 
Our work fits within a broader literature on access to counsel in civil 
cases.  Scholars have examined these issues across many contexts, 
including housing court, family court, and benefits adjudications.47  We add 
to this literature with a focus on one of the most important reasons that 
immigrants face their hearings without a lawyer:  lack of time to save up for 
and find one. 
B.  The Statutory Right to Counsel 
The INA provides immigrants the right to counsel at no expense to the 
government.48  That right is also guaranteed by regulations issued pursuant 
to the statute.49 
The regulations also include provisions to allow respondents time to seek 
counsel.  When a respondent moves for a continuance, the IJ may grant the 
motion for good cause shown.50  Absent a formal motion for a continuance, 
the IJ may also adjourn the hearing to a later date “either at his or her own 
instance or, for good cause shown, upon application by the respondent or 
the [Immigration and Naturalization Service].”51 
In In re C-B-,52 the BIA held that when the respondent does not expressly 
waive his or her right to counsel, these statutory and regulatory authorities 
require the IJ to “grant a reasonable and realistic period of time to provide a 
fair opportunity for a respondent to seek, speak with, and retain counsel.”53  
In other words, the BIA has recognized that the statute and regulations give 
rise to an obligation not only to grant an adjournment or continuance upon 
good cause shown, but also to set a date that provides the respondent with a 
fair opportunity to retain counsel. 
 
 46. See id. 
 47. For a review of the literature, see Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to 
Civil Gideon:  What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 40–44 (2010). 
 48. INA §§ 240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2012). 
 49. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.16(b), 1240.3, 1240.11(c)(1)(iii) (2015). 
 50. Id. § 1003.29. 
 51. Id. § 1240.6. 
 52. 25 I. & N. Dec. 888 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 53. Id. at 889. 
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In re C-B-’s holding has not yet been cited by any court of appeals.  That 
neglect partly reflects the fact that very few unrepresented respondents 
petition for review; the respondent in In re C-B- proceeded pro se.54  By 
contrast, many of the circuit court cases on continuances have arisen after 
an IJ denied a represented respondent’s right to a continuance.  Even where 
the circuit courts have expressly considered the denial of a continuance to 
seek counsel, most of the cases concern a respondent’s right to a 
continuance after their lawyers withdraw.  In other words, the appellate case 
law has arisen in the context of a privileged and unrepresentative subset of 
all respondents who are denied continuances.  The analysis we provide, and 
the framework we suggest, is necessary because the courts of appeals rarely 
(if ever) have the opportunity to consider this issue despite its importance 
for most indigent immigrants in removal proceedings. 
As a threshold matter, the general review of a denial of a continuance 
should not be confused with the more specific review of a continuance to 
seek counsel.  For example, Peng v. Holder55 appeared to set out a standard 
governing the review of the denial of a continuance.  In Peng, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the IJ “should consider factors including ‘(1)  the nature of 
the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2)  the 
reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3)  the inconvenience to the 
court, and (4)  the number of continuances previously granted.’”56 
Yet the court applied this standard where a represented respondent was 
denied a continuance—the plaintiff in Peng needed time to apply for a 
section 212(c) waiver.57  Moreover, the cases on which the Peng court 
relied all concerned represented respondents who requested continuances 
for one reason or another.58 
By contrast, courts correctly employ a different standard to decide 
whether the denial of a continuance specifically violated a respondent’s 
right to counsel.  The courts of appeals simultaneously consider whether the 
denial of the continuance violated the respondent’s statutory right to 
counsel and whether the denial constituted a due process violation.59  In 
deciding whether a particular denial violated the right to counsel, courts 
exercise substantial discretion.  When courts affirm the denial, they often 
emphasize the IJ’s discretionary control of his or her docket;60 when they 
 
 54. Id. at 888. 
 55. 673 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 56. Id. at 1253 (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 57. Id. at 1253–57. 
 58. Id. at 1253; see Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1011–12 (reviewing a denial of a continuance 
requested by counsel while the appeal of the visa petition was pending); Baires v. INS, 856 
F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing a denial of a continuance to gather more written 
evidence); see also Karapetyan v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing 
a denial of a continuance to submit fingerprints). 
 59. See Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he two claims 
are one and the same.”). 
 60. See Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that an IJ’s 
discretion to manage his or her docket is “wide,” and affirming a denial of a continuance 
where the respondent’s lawyer withdrew and the respondent waived his right to counsel). 
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reverse, they emphasize the right to counsel.61  One may search in vain for 
a clear test governing when the denial of a continuance becomes 
unreasonable enough to require reversal. 
Perhaps more important than the test (or lack of one), however, are the 
standard of review and the requirement that respondents show that they 
were prejudiced by the denial of the continuance.  The circuits are split on 
both of these questions.  In the Ninth Circuit, the denial of a continuance to 
seek counsel presents a question of law that the court reviews de novo.62  In 
the Third Circuit, by contrast, the court reviews a noncitizen’s challenge of 
an IJ’s denial of a continuance to seek counsel for abuse of discretion.63 
Moreover, the circuits are split on whether a respondent must show 
prejudice to challenge a violation of his or her right to counsel.  The 
petitioner must show prejudice in the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, but 
not in the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.64  This split 
reflects a broader split on the question of when courts may reverse agency 
action in the absence of a showing of prejudice.  In Leslie v. Attorney 
General of the United States,65 for example, the Third Circuit held that 
when a regulation protects a fundamental statutory or constitutional right, a 
court may reverse agency failure to comply with the regulation even if there 
is no showing of prejudice.66  Leslie concerned an IJ’s failure to comply 
with the regulation requiring IJs to advise respondents that free legal 
services may be available and to provide a list of such services.67  The court 
granted the petition for review.68  The Ninth Circuit recently applied this 
reasoning in reversing an IJ’s denial of a continuance for a respondent 
whose attorney failed to appear:  in Montes-Lopez v. Holder,69 the court 
concluded both that the denial of the continuance violated the respondent’s 
right to counsel and that no showing of prejudice was necessary for 
reversal.70 
This conclusion was also consistent with a line of older cases in which 
the Ninth Circuit held that an IJ’s denial of a continuance violated the 
statutory right to representation.  In Castro-Nuno v. INS,71 the respondent’s 
lawyer had appeared at two initial master calendar hearings, but the case 
was continued to a third hearing because INS officers failed to appear.72  At 
that third hearing, the respondent’s lawyer failed to appear.73  The 
 
 61. See Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to 
“allow a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness to render the right to counsel an empty 
formality” (quoting Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005))). 
 62. Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 63. Ponce-Leiva, 331 F.3d at 377. 
 64. See Montes-Lopez, 694 F.3d at 1090 (discussing the circuit split). 
 65. 611 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 66. Id. at 180. 
 67. Id. at 173 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)–(3) (2015)). 
 68. Id. at 183. 
 69. 694 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 70. Id. at 1088–94. 
 71. 577 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 72. Id. at 578. 
 73. Id. 
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respondent repeatedly asked to speak with his lawyer, but the IJ ignored 
these requests, conducted the hearing, and eventually allowed the 
respondent to depart voluntarily from the United States.74  The Ninth 
Circuit, relying on the statutory right to counsel in immigration proceedings 
and the fact that the respondent did not waive that right, held that the IJ 
should have granted a continuance sua sponte.75  Similarly, in Rios-Berrios 
v. INS,76 the court relied partly on case law from the criminal context to 
conclude that two continuances of one working day each deprived the 
respondent of his statutory right to counsel.77  The court held that the 
brevity of the continuances, particularly after the INS’s decision to transfer 
the respondent from California to Florida, constituted an abuse of discretion 
and violated both the respondent’s statutory right to counsel and the 
underlying due process right that the statutory right codifies.78 
In sum, the circuits are split on two questions:  (1)  whether to review the 
denial of a continuance to seek counsel de novo or for abuse of discretion, 
and (2)  whether a petitioner must demonstrate prejudice to obtain reversal 
of that denial.  Notably absent from the case law is any treatment of the 
length of continuances, rather than their denial.  This varying and 
incomplete treatment of continuance length demonstrates the need for a 
rational framework that explicitly acknowledges the practical importance of 
time between hearings. 
C.  A Due Process Framework for Continuance Length 
The standard due process framework should make the consideration of 
empirical evidence a natural part of determining whether procedures are 
constitutionally sufficient.  The Executive and the courts should consider 
the effect of continuance length on access to counsel in weighing how much 
time is constitutionally adequate.  Although our direct reliance on 
quantitative evidence may appear novel, it does not break new doctrinal 
ground:  empirical judgments are crucial to both the Mathews v. Eldridge 
due process standard and the fundamental fairness due process standard, 
which developed in the immigration context. 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 579.  An IJ’s duty to grant reasonable requests for continuances could also 
spring from his or her statutory and ethical obligation to develop the record and guide the 
respondent through his or her proceedings.  In Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461 (8th Cir. 
2004), the court affirmed the IJ’s denial of a continuance after the respondent’s lawyer 
withdrew, but found that the IJ failed to give the respondent a full opportunity to develop the 
record and therefore violated his due process rights—partly because the respondent lacked 
time to prepare after his request for a continuance was denied. Id. at 464–66.  An IJ’s 
affirmative duty to develop the record stems partly from the INA. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and 
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”). 
 76. 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 77. See id. at 862–63. 
 78. Id. 
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In Mathews, the Court set out a standard for determining whether 
procedures are sufficient to pass constitutional due process muster.  That 
standard requires weighing 
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.79 
Our evidence, which demonstrates that longer continuances increase the 
chance that respondents will find counsel, speaks directly to the second 
factor:  the value that a longer continuance (the procedural safeguard) 
provides is the higher chance of finding a lawyer. 
Of course, quantifying this value, as we have done, does not eliminate the 
need to weigh the private interest in additional procedure against the 
government’s interest in faster proceedings.  Yet the private interest in 
representation in immigration court is a particularly strong one, and the 
government interest in shorter continuances is not.  Although backlog and 
delay in immigration court are real problems, the most important factor in 
delay is the difficulty of scheduling an individual merits hearing:  in some 
courts, such hearings are now being scheduled already for 2019.80 
The fundamental fairness test, historically applicable in the immigration 
context, draws on principles similar to those that underpin the Mathews test.  
To reverse on fundamental fairness grounds, a court of appeals must find a 
fundamental procedural error, as well as prejudice resulting from that 
error.81  Although we argue below that a finding of prejudice should not be 
necessary for the reversal of a denial of a continuance, the prejudice 
requirement reflects concerns similar to those underlying the Mathews test:  
courts attempt to estimate the importance of the procedures at hand. 
To evaluate whether short continuances violate due process, courts 
should look to the aggregate evidence of harm rather than to prejudice in 
any individual case.  The reason is simple:  the prejudice determination 
requires a court to assemble a hypothetical counterfactual.  The court is 
forced to guess what would have happened in the case had the IJ granted a 
longer continuance.  In any individual case, that is nearly impossible—even 
setting aside the fact that immigrants granted short continuances are 
unlikely to appeal, and therefore such cases are necessarily rare.  Imagine 
(plausibly) a child who has no connections in the United States and was the 
victim of abuse in Central America that he or she is afraid to discuss in 
court.  Imagine further that he or she receives a very short continuance, and 
without a lawyer to gain the child’s trust and elicit his or her story, that 
abuse remains absent from the record.  In the unlikely event that the child 
were to appeal, the BIA would have little choice but to conclude that the 
 
 79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 80. We noted this timing in December 2015. 
 81. See Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 465–66 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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short continuance caused little prejudice; the record would contain no facts 
suggesting that the child was entitled to asylum. 
This type of counterfactual determination asks the impossible of 
appellate adjudicators, but it is precisely what quantitative causal inference 
can accomplish in the aggregate.82  We therefore propose a regulation that 
draws on these empirical results, but in the absence of such a rule, we urge 
courts of appeals to consider our results when weighing the importance of 
continuance length. 
III.  MORE SEARCHING REVIEW AND A 
PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT TO A NINETY-DAY CONTINUANCE 
More time means a better chance of finding a lawyer and remaining in 
the United States.  Drawing on these empirical results, which we believe fit 
naturally into due process doctrine, we conclude with recommendations for 
both the courts of appeals and EOIR, which supervises the country’s 
immigration courts. 
We argue, first, that the denial of a continuance to seek representation 
should be reviewed de novo, as the denial itself makes review so much less 
likely—by diminishing the respondent’s chance of finding a lawyer and 
eventually appealing.  When an IJ denies a continuance, that IJ not only 
makes the immigrant less likely to find a lawyer and to avoid deportation, 
but also makes the immigrant less likely to appeal a deportation order.83  
Indeed, our case search did not yield a single example of an immigrant who 
was denied a continuance and petitioned for review of that denial pro se.  
Because the denial of a continuance is so unlikely to be reviewed, we think 
it unfair to further insulate the denial from review by deferring to the 
judgment of the IJ. 
Similarly, the prejudice requirement is unfair in light of the empirical 
evidence that shorter continuances systematically prevent pro se 
respondents from finding counsel.  An individual showing of prejudice 
imposes a perverse burden upon a pro se litigant:  it requires him or her to 
marshal, on appeal, the evidence that his or her lawyer would have obtained 
had the continuance been granted.84  The requirement places the respondent 
in a catch-22:  without a lawyer, the respondent cannot show what evidence 
the lawyer would have marshaled. 
Finally, perhaps the most notable shortcoming of the existing case law is 
its failure to address the length of continuances.  Our empirical findings 
show that continuance length has a dramatic impact on the right to 
counsel.85  Relying on our finding that the impact of a longer continuance is 
large for continuances of under ninety days, we propose a presumption:  
continuances of under ninety days for nondetained immigrants should be 
 
 82. Of course, our study is not a randomized controlled trial.  Yet our attempt does take 
advantage of the arbitrary nature of first continuance lengths, together with judge-fixed 
effects, to draw plausible causal inferences. 
 83. See Hausman, supra note 33, at 24–25. 
 84. See supra Part II.C. 
 85. See supra Figure 3. 
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presumptively invalid.  The burden should be on the government to justify a 
shorter continuance. 
Of course, our findings cover only one population—families and 
children—in one recent time period.  We readily acknowledge that access to 
counsel varies across courts and over time.  We therefore suggest that EOIR 
perform an analysis similar to the one we have performed, but for each 
immigration court on an annual basis.  This is feasible:  EOIR already 
publishes a statistical yearbook with descriptive statistics broken down by 
court.86  A court-by-court analysis of continuance length and access to 
counsel would allow a regionally sensitive presumption.  EOIR may 
implement a rule requiring such review—and a ninety-day presumption—
either through instruction to the country’s immigration courts or by a formal 
rulemaking process. 
These proposals, which would require minimal resources, would 
significantly increase immigrants’ chances of finding a lawyer, helping to 
make the right to counsel a reality. 
CONCLUSION 
Our findings and recommendations are simple.  Time matters to 
immigrants facing deportation, who are learning to navigate the 
immigration courts and scraping together money for a lawyer.  Setting a 
presumptive minimum continuance length can begin to remedy the due 
process violation that short continuances impose. 
 
 86. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at A5 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/ 
2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf [perma.cc/98GX-WZ95]. 
